Technical Remote Viewing University - The Signal Line News Reports
Flashback: Targeting Iraq

Technical Remote Viewing's Role In Locating Weapons Of Mass Destruction

By Jeff Lucas
September 26, 2002

       In recent weeks, there has been intense debate about whether Iraq continues to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction. Since the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have been at the forefront of the campaign to enforce the U.N. Security Resolutions that have been ignored by Iraq for the past decade.

       U.N. weapons inspectors have not had access to Iraq since Saddam's regime ended all cooperation in 1998. Penetrating Saddam's inner circle has proven difficult for Western intelligence agencies, due to the fact that Hussein surrounds himself exclusively by either family members (which he reportedly routinely murders) or people he has known since childhood at his birthplace in the village of Tikreet.

       UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), formed in December 1999 to replace the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) which Saddam expelled, makes use of commercial satellite imagery. They compare a database of 15,000 items for changes at sites inspectors have previously visited. But satellites cannot see through roofs.

       Fortunately, there is an intelligence collection technique that governments can avail themselves to when conventional methods fail - Technical Remote Viewing . On several occasions since 1991, remote viewers at PSI TECH have turned their attention to hidden weapon sites in Iraq, locating canisters containing the deadliest bioweapons known to man, using only their trained minds, pen and paper, while sitting at their desks thousands of miles away.

Background: A Decade Of Defiance

       Resolution 687, adopted on April 3, 1991, demanded Iraq provide full disclosure of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers . It further declared that Iraq shall accept unconditionally, under international supervision, the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of its weapons of mass destruction.

       The resolution created the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and called on inspection teams to be given "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted" access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect. In May of 1991, Iraq accepted the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and its personnel. These guarantees include the right of "unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment.

       However, in June of 1991, Iraqi personnel fired warning shots to prevent the inspectors from approaching their vehicles. Two months later, Iraqi officials confiscated documents from the inspectors. The inspectors refused to yield a second set of documents. In response, Iraq refused to allow the team to leave the site with these documents. A four-day standoff ensued, but Iraq permitted the team to leave with the documents after a statement from the Security Council threatens enforcement actions. This began Saddam's seven year long game of cat and mouse with inspectors, agreeing at times to allow them greater access and then frustrating their attempts to visit suspected weapons sites.

Remote Viewing Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

       On November 19, 1991, the United Nations turned to PSI TECH to help locate Saddam Hussein's hidden weapons sites. Sketches from remote viewing sessions performed by PSI TECH remote viewers were carried into Baghdad by Maj. Karen Jansen (U.S. Army.) (See Washington Times article.)

      Over the next seven years, Iraq continued to obstruct the inspection teams' investigations, including refusing access to key sites and blocking UNSCOM from removing remnants of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq. In November of 1996, Iraqi escorts on board an UNSCOM helicopter try to physically prevent the pilot from flying the helicopter in the direction of its intended destination. On September 17, 1997, while seeking access to a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape Iraqi guards moving files, burning documents, and dumping ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

      On February 23, 1998, Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations, pledging to accept all relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and to grant to UNSCOM and the IAEA "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access for their inspections.

       In the Spring of 1998 PSI TECH was asked to identify Iraq's hidden bio weapon facilities again. On March 2nd, PSI TECH sent a report to the White House and DIA detailing the location of a clandestine Iraqi biological warfare agent production facility within a nitrogen fertilizer plant, located along the Tigris River, northwest of Mosul, in the vicinity of Zumma. In the report, PSI TECH stated, "This "boiler room" operation is producing Anthrax or Clostridium perfringens." "We assess the Zumma area site to be the largest currently operating BW production facility in Iraq."

Five days later, on March 7, the Associated Press reported the following:

"BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - In a rare trip outside the capital, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein today toured the district of Mosul in northern Iraq, the official Iraqi News Agency said. State-run television showed crowds shouting "With our blood and souls we will defend you, Saddam." Also today, a U.N. team led by American Scott Ritter finished its second day of inspections aimed at uncovering Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi News Agency said the team carried out three surprise inspections that "went ahead in a normal manner according to procedures agreed upon by the two sides."
      On August 5, 1998, Iraq's The Revolutionary Command Council and the Baath Party Command decided to stop cooperating with UNSCOM and the IAEA until the Security Council agrees to lift the oil embargo as a first step towards ending sanctions.

      After a continuous program of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial, UNSCOM concluded that it was unable to fulfill its mandate and the inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.

Allies Build Case Against Iraq

      Last Tuesday, the British government issued a 50 page dossier on Iraq. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, the British assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for up to 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tons of VX nerve agent, growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured), and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

The dossier contained the following statement:

"Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services."
      Iraq's regime and hidden weapons of terror are indeed difficult to penetrate. But there is one intelligence collection technique that Saddam cannot hide from. There is one tool that can penetrate any bunker, any factory and any mind - Technical Remote Viewing . PSI TECH remains dedicated to its mission of providing adjunct intelligence information, when called upon, for the protection of the world.


For more information on TRV, visit the following links:

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